Американская военная машина. Глубинная политика, глобальная связь ЦРУ с наркотиками и путь в Афганистан - Peter Dale Scott

22, 1997, before the Italian Parliamentary Commission on Terrorism headed by Senator Giovanni Pellegrino, http://www.parlamento.it/bicam/terror/stenografici/steno26.htm). I shall try to argue that the truth is more complex.

85. FBI Report, Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA), January 21, 1982, National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/

ch02-06.htm.

86. FBI Report, Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA), January 21, 1982, National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/

ch02-06.htm.

87. FBI Report, Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA), January 21, 1982, National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/

ch02-06.htm.

88. John Dinges and Saul Landau, Assassination on Embassy Row (New York: Pantheon, 1980).

89. Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 316.

90. John Prados, The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 423.

91. McSherry, Predatory States, 6. Cf., e.g., “Michael Townley: Ex agente de la CIA relata la conspiración,” El Correo de la Diaspora Argentine, May 10, 2000, http://www

.elcorreo.eu.org/esp/article.php3?id_article=4329.

92. John Dinges, The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (New York: New Press, 2004), 165; Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York: New Press, 2003).

93. In addition, the Cuban Nationalist Movement, the CORU component that supplied DINA with Letelier’s assassins, was said to be financing itself through drug smuggling organized by DINA (Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall, Cocaine Politics: The CIA, Drugs, and Armies in Central America [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998], 30–31, 33).

94. Costa Rican authorities later said that Bosch’s target in Costa Rica was not Kissinger but Pascal Allende, nephew of the slain president of Chile (McSherry, Predatory States, 159).

95. Henrik Krüger, The Great Heroin Coup—Drugs, Intelligence, and International Fascism, trans. Jerry Meldon (Boston: South End Press, 1980), 186n18, citing NACLA Report, January–February 1978 (Falconbridge).

96. Saul Landau, They Educated the Crows: An Institute Report on the Letelier-Moffit Murders (n.p.: Transnational Institute, 1978), 28n.

97. “Some sources in Miami said the Bonao gathering and the creation of CORU had the active support of the CIA and at least the acquiescence of the FBI, and that CORU was allowed to operate to punish Castro for his Angola policy without directly implicating the United States government” (Dinges and Landau, Assassination on Embassy Row, 251).

98. Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Metropolitan/Henry Holt, 2007), 66–71, 76–78, 81–86, 98–100.

99. Orlando Letelier, “The Chicago Boys in Chile: Economic Freedom’s Awful Toll,” The Nation, August 28, 1976.

100. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 21–22, 51–52.

101. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 39–42, 89–102; Scott, The War Conspiracy, 12–13. David Rockefeller described in his memoirs, almost with pride, his role in persuading Kissinger and the Nixon White House to act against Allende (David Rockefeller, Memoirs [New York: Random House, 2002], 432–33).

102. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 80–81, 309; Bernard Gwertzman, New York Times, November 18, 1979. The military coup in Argentina in 1976 was welcomed by Kissinger, by then secretary of state under President Ford. Kissinger arranged for the junta’s minister of economy, José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, to meet with David and Nelson Rockefeller to discuss Argentina’s plans for privatization and foreign investment. Within a year, according to Naomi Klein, “wages lost 40 percent of their value, factories closed, poverty spiraled” (Klein, The Shock Doctrine, 89).

103. Ariel C. Armony, Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central America (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1997), xiii, 35–46. Carter’s human rights policy was undercut by the CIA. Argentine intelligence operative Leandro Sánchez Reisse testified to a U.S. congressional subcommittee in 1987 how Argentine intelligence set up, with the sanction of the CIA, a Condor base in Miami in 1978. The base then handled both drug money–laundering and counterinsurgency operations in Latin America on behalf of both Argentina and the CIA (Armony, Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central America, 46–47; McSherry, Predatory States, 212–13).

104. Bertil Lintner, Blood Brothers: The Criminal Underworld of Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 8–9.

105. Frank Viviano, “Hong Kong Triads’ New Frontier,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 25, 1997, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/

archive/1997/05/28/MN25477.DTL. Cf. Fredric Dannen, “Partners in Crime, Part II,” New Republic, July 14/21, 1997: “In a recent issue of Apple Daily, Hong Kong’s leading Chinese-language newspaper, a reputed member of the 14K triad society boasted that he and his triad brothers had established ‘terrific guanxi’ with Communist officials, and cited a thriving partnership in cross-border prostitution.”

Chapter 2: Mexico, Drugs, the DFS, and the United States

1. From U.S. government investigative file, in Jamie Dettmer, “Family Affairs—Mexican Businessman and Politician Carlos Hank Gonzalez Allegedly Involved in Drug Trade,” Insight, March 29, 1999, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_12_15/ai_54246287.

2. A border used for major smuggling typically induces corruption on both sides. For example, in April 2006 a former head of the FBI in El Paso was indicted on five counts of lying in connection with the investigation into gifts he had received from a Mexican racetrack owner whom Mexican officials alleged was a member of a drug cartel (Reuters, April 12, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12292463).

3. In chapter 6, I shall make a similar argument, that a “metagroup” in the global narcosystem was able to control specific actions by the Russian government.

4. The term “narcodemocracy” received currency in 1995 with the publication of Eduardo Valle’s El Segundo disparo: La narcodemocracia mexicana (The Second Shot: The Mexican Narcodemocracy) (Mexico City: Oceano, 1995). Cf. Leonardo Curzio, “Organized Crime and Political Campaign Finance in Mexico,” in Organized Crime and Democratic Governability: Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands, John Bailey and Roy Godson (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 85.

5. Manuel Buendía, La CIA en Mexico (Mexico City: Oceano, 1983), 24.

6. John Bailey and Roy Godson, “Introduction,” in Bailey and Godson, Organized Crime and Democratic Governability, 24.

7. Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 62.

8. Luís Astorga, “Organized Crime and the Organization of